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While at Columbia Law School, Irvin Rutter partook of the fruits of
one of the most creative periods in the history of American legal edu-
cation. Those exciting days were just after the formative twenties and
thirties, when such American legal realists as Karl Llewellyn, William
0. Douglas, Herman Oliphant and Walter Wheeler Cook recon-
structed the relationship between law in action and law in the books.
Professor Rutter's jurisprudence reflects not just this realist tradi-
tion but also his own eclectic attitude toward the complexities of skills
that lawyers need. In his jurisprudence of legal operations, each prac-
tical, concrete operation of skill applies not only to the task at hand
but also to the tasks that lie ahead. After a love affair with clinical
education, legal educators are now returning to the basic skills intro-
duced by Rutter in the early 60's. Fresh, new scholars quote him; '
after the fads have passed, the need remains to go beyond the clinical
education to a theoretical mode. The return to Rutter's insights pro-
vides a superstructure for applied skills.
In contrast to Laswell's and McDougal's comprehensive, value-
oriented (or configurative) jurisprudence, Irvin Rutter's approach is
skeptical of the grand abstractions and obscure language of the social
scientist, preferring growth through the cases of the common law
judge and lawyer. 2 This contrast is misleading in its simplicity, how-
ever, for Professor Rutter's practical jurisprudence approach involves
more than simply resolution of the particular decision. Operations of
jurisprudence should inform each concrete and particular point of de-
cision to resolve the point of dispute or tension, so that the result
becomes greater than the specific event. The event can then be re-
lated by operation of mind and thought to the next day's event. This
continuity gives stability to change and relates the particular to en-
during principles.
Professor Rutter's simplicity in working these operations into the
applied skills of legal education constitutes what Karl Llewellyn
termed the technology of law, in contrast to the philosophy of law.
Every law school and legal education program likewise must translate
*Dean and Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. E.g., Gale, Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 ALBANY L. REv.
198, 306 (1980).
2. See Redmount, Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 677, 682-83 (1978).
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its premises into operations, through the technology of legal educa-
tion. While doing so, a faculty must never lose sight of the other side
of the coin, the philosophy of law, which Llewellyn also clarified in
his lectures on jurisprudence. While Professor Rutter has never de-
veloped an express "philosophy of law," the legal operations and skills
that he teaches are grounded on tacit assumptions that deserve
explicit attention. These underpinnings might be summarized as fol-
lows:
1. Abstractions, and abstractions of rules, are not just misleading,
they are dangerous. Only when the mind's eye is fixed by
imagining precise images of fact patterns made concrete
through a series of repetitive intellectual operations can a stu-
dent come to understand law.
2. The capacity of all of us for self-delusion renders suspect any
legal abstraction unless we carefully derive it from a particular
decision in relation to the prior case. A fact pattern plus one is
the narrowest abstraction possible and the barest meaning of
the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, the danger of delusion in
reasoning is reduced when the prior case is construed to its
narrowest pattern of generality.
3. If this operation of mind were not possible and pure human
skepticism were to deny that any prior case applied to any
facts other than its own, no case would serve as authoritative
guidance to any other case, and each case would be as good as
any other. This atomistic self-indulgence would negate the
structure of legal thought entirely and lead to a purely subjec-
tive choice for every case, with law being simply a post hoc
rationalization for judicial decisions. Professor Rutter rejects
this nihilism by insisting on careful linkage to patterns of fact
and authority.
4. Translating these principles of operation into applied skills be-
ginning with perceptions of fact, Professor Rutter includes in-
sights of psychology and other sciences, again implicitly and
with some skepticism about how questions of law and fact ap-
pear in the particular operations the lawyer performs. In these
operations the lawyer must take the greatest care not to im-
pose unconsciously his subjective preferences, oblivious of the
arrogance or hubris of unexamined premises. More impor-
tantly, he must disdain the pure subjectivism of those who use
law only to justify their conscious preferences.
Professor Rutter's operational jurisprudence utilizes linguistics
quite explicitly as a major foundation, dovetailing with learning
theory. The "existence precedes essence" of the existentialists is
[Vol. 49
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IRVIN C. RUTTER
transformed, in less Delphic terms, into the simpler point that all
theorizing, including the grandest philosophical systems, must origi-
nate of necessity out of the experience of life. This experience con-
sists of the events of daily existence, and immediately or remotely the
theorizing must be about these events. When the abstract generaliza-
tions lose touch with the daily "trivia" of life, they become meaning-
less. But so long as the nexus with reality is retained, the theorizing,
in a subtle r'envoi, will illumine and affect the "trivia."
While grounded on a thorough knowledge of structural and seman-
tic linguistics, Professor Rutter's interest in language is also "opera-
tional" in the sense that he insists on its practical utility. The connec-
tion with the learning process derives from the proposition that it is
the unique human capacity for language, inseparable from what we
call "thinking," that makes the generalizations of theory possible. As
applied to the educational process, by utilizing our knowledge of the
structure and function of language it becomes possible to enhance the
effectiveness of its "thinking" counterpart, thus approaching that edu-
cational will-o'-the-wisp called training in thinking, and for the
lawyer, "thinking like a lawyer."
True to his objective, Professor Rutter does not stop with this
generalizing, and, as he has put it, in concrete implementation lies
proof of the pudding. He presses on to use it in raising the level of
effectiveness in the concrete and specific details of the operations of
lawyers, and this lies at the foundation of his "jurisprudence of
lawyers' operations." Preliminary descriptions have appeared in the
course of years, intertwined with his many implementations. 3 Since
he is concerned with reaching law students and lawyers, he has rec-
ognized that it is not enough to address himself to philosophers. In
one notable published example, he has combined the theoretical and
down-to-earth elements in applying them to the process of analysis
and synthesis of cases and the "anatomy of rules of law," addressed to
first-year law students. 4 Throughout his writings and his teaching,
he uses the approach, often without explicit reference to the theoreti-
cal underpinnings.
3. Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operation, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301, 318 (1961);
Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First-Degree Law Curriculum, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 9, 78,
82 (1968); Rutter, Law Teaching and the Curriculum, 1963 A.A.L.S. REP. 81; Rutter, The
Trial Judge and the Judicial Process, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 245 (1963).
4. Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First-Degree Law Curriculum, 37 U. CIN. L. REV.
9, 82 (1968).
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While his magnum opus, entitled "Law, Language and Thinking
Like a Lawyer," has been published preliminarily and used in some
of his courses, we eagerly await its more general availability.
5
Recently, in recognizing Rutter's work, Llewellyn's biographer,
William Twining, has written:
At the University of Cincinnati Professor Irvin C. Rutter in con-
junction with a series of particular courses developed the best
theoretical analysis of lawyers' operations that has yet appeared in
print. 6
Now, when the new generation of scholars seeks to transcend the
narrowness and boredom of the clinical method, Rutter's work
emerges after a quarter-century, providing a sounder intellectual base
than much of what popularly is offered as clinical education. Espe-
cially in writing, drafting, and the facts process, he is eternally fresh.
He is truly the father of the theory of the applied skills of legal edu-
cation.
5. Comments by some who have studied this work include those by Myres S. McDougal of
the Yale Law School: "The most profound study of law and semantics I have seen. It makes
most of the points the American legal realists made, but much more clearly and persuasively
than they ever made them."; and by Charles D. Breitel, former Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals: "Magnificent, and as important as was Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush."
"Linguistics and the Law" was the subject of a series of seminars conducted by Professor
Rutter as a Visiting Scholar at the University of Iowa. From a different perspective, it was the
subject of his address at an International Conference on Legal Writing at Indiana University.
6. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 355-56 (1973).
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